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NETTING THE OUTSIDER: THE NEED FOR A
BROADER RESTATEMENT OF INSIDER
TRADING DOCTRINE
ROBERT B. TITus·
PETER G. CARROLL··
INTRODUCTION

For the better part of forty years, federal courts have employed
the broad general language of Rule lOb-5 1 to circumscribe the use for
trading of material non public information2 concerning a corporation
• Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law, B.A.
Yale University, 1962; LL.B Yale Law School, 1968.
•• B.A. Harvard University, 1983; Ph.D. Tufts University, 1983. Graduates from
Western New England College School of Law in May 1986. This article developed from a
tutorial undertaken by Messrs. Titus and Carroll.
1. Rule lOb-5 provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1985).
2. In this article, we employ the term "inside" or material, non public information to
cover both true "inside information," i.e., nonpublic information originating from within
and concerning the issuer of the securities involved, and "market information," i. e., infor
mation from external sources but which may affect the value of the issuer's securities as
traded.
See, e.g., the discussion of "market information" in Fleischer, Mundheim and Mur
phy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA.
127
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by "insiders" of that corporation. The ripples of liability gradually
have spread outward from the center-from true insiders3 to tempo
rary or "quasi" insiders4 to true outsiders such as "tippees"5 and even
"subtippees."6 The United States Supreme Court set out, in United
States v. Chiarella, 7 limitations regarding the circumstances in which
liability under Rule lOb-5 can be imposed. The Court followed up its
Chiarella ruling with a decision three years later in SEC v. Dirks, 8 a
decision intended to specify similar limits to the liability under Rule
lOb-5 of tippees trading on material non public information.
The central holding of Chiarella is that an insider will be obli
gated to "abstain or disclose" under Rule lOb-5 only where the insider
has a preexisting duty, arising out of a fiduciary or similar relationship
of trust or confidence, to the party injured by the insider's trading
transactions. 9 In the absence of any such relationship, the insider is
not liable for injuries or damages suffered by a person buying or selling
securities without access to the same information as the insider, nor is
the insider subject to criminal or administrative sanctions. Dirks rep
resents the related proposition that an outsider, e.g., a tippee, buying
L. REV. 798, 799 (1973). The courts have not distinguished between different types of
inside information for purposes of IOb-5 liability generally, a result which seems consistent
with the broad wording of Rule IOb-5.
3. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In this context, insiders include directors, officers, and em
ployees of an issuer of securities who have access to information regarding that issuer by
virtue of their position with the issuer.
4. Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 409-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); SEC v. Lund, 570 F.
Supp. 1397, 1402-03 (C.D. Cal. 1983). Such terms include persons (for example, business
associates, independent contractors) who are not traditional insiders but assume the duties
of such on a temporary basis by virtue of a special relationship with the issuer. Id. at 1403.
5. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 237-38 (2d Cir.
1974). The term "tippee" customarily is used to refer to a person who has no preexisting
relationship with an issuer but who obtains non public information concerning that issuer
directly or indirectly from an insider.
6. See, e.g., SEC v. Musella, 578 F. SUpp. 425,438-39 (1984). A sUbtippee is a per
son who receives material, nonpublic information from a tippee rather than a tipper. In
many of the principal cases involving the liability of a tippee, the Securities and Exchange
Commission also has brought civil or criminal proceedings against persons receiving infor
mation from the principal tippees. Thus, for example, many of the persons charged in SEC
V. Musella received the inside information concerning pending acquisitions from Alan Ihne,
the service manager at the Sullivan & Cromwell law firm, through a former stockbroker.
Other examples of more well known sUbtippees would include the various institutional
clients of Raymond Dirks, the girl friend of the stockbroker tipped by Paul Thayer, and
certain clients of the stockbrokers tipped by R. Foster Winans. See notes 58-59 and 80-85
and accompanying text.
7. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
8. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
9. 445 U.S. at 232-33.
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or selling securities upon material, nonpublic information from an in
sider is liable only if the insider has breached a fiduciary relationship
in disclosing the information to the tippee, and the tippee knows or
should have known that the insider has committed such a breach. \0 In
other words, a tippee's liability is totally derivative from, and depen
dent upon, a breach of duty by the insider.
A flood of articles and commentary from both the academic com
munity and members of the practicing bar 11 has followed the Chiarella
and Dirks decisions. Many commentators have bemoaned the narrow
ness of the fiduciary duty standard articulated in those decisions. 12
Some have urged greater use of an alternative ground for liability,
such as the misappropriation theory or some other concept,13 and still
others have proposed new legislative proscriptions. 14 Most agree that
some standards in addition to or in lieu of the fiduciary duty tests used
by the Supreme Court in Chiarella and Dirks are appropriate if addi
tional troublesome conduct involving securities trading by persons
with access to material, nonpublic information is to be deterred. Of
particular concern is trading by persons other than (1) traditional in
10. 463 U.S. at 660-64.
11. See, e.g., Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory ofLiability for Trading on
Nonpub/ic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101 (1984); Fischel, Insider Trading and
Investment Analysts: An Economic Analysis of Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commis
sion, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 127 (1984); Heller, Chiarella. SEC Rule J4e-3 and Dirks: "Fair
ness" versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. LAW. 517 (1982); Langevoort, Insider Trading and
the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1982); Macey,
From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13
HOFSTRA L. REV. 9 (1984); Report of the Task Force on Regulation ofInsider Trading, 41
Bus. LAW. 223 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Task Force].
12. See particularly Langevoort, supra note 11, at 16-39; Aldave, supra note 11, at
107-11; Phillips and Zutz, The Insider Trading Doctrine: A Needfor Legislative Repair, 13
HOFSTRA L. REV. 65 (1984); Note, Insider Trading: Circumventing the Restrictive Con
tours of the Chiarella and Dirks Decisions, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 503 (1985); Task Force,
supra note 11, at 233-35.
13. Several lower courts have formulated an alternative basis for dealing with insider
trading under Rule 10b-5 in the form of the so-called "misappropriation theory," the out
lines of which first were suggested in Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 240-41. See infra notes 53-95 and accompanying text.
14. Congress has enacted the Insider Trading Sanctions Act, intended to strengthen
the enforcement efforts of the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding insider trad
ing. That legislation introduces additional twists to the plot, insofar as it purports, on one
hand. to leave the existing case law under Rule IOb-5 undisturbed and yet, on the other
hand, clearly is premised upon policy bases broader than those accepted or articulated by
the Supreme Court in Chiarella or Dirks. See infra notes 95-110 and accompanying text.
And, not to be outdone, an American Bar Association Task Force has come up with spe
cific recommendations for legislative and/or administrative rulemaking proposals to fur
ther clarify the applicable standards governing insider trading. Task Force, supra note 11,
at 253-64.
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siders, that is, persons who have a preexisting relationship to the is
suer, or (2) tippees of such insiders, but who nevertheless trade on
inside information. Indeed, the obstacles to imposing liability on such
traders (whom we label "outsiders" for ease of reference) under the
present framework is our main criticism of that framework.
While it no doubt would be helpful were Congress to enact legis
lation explicitly defining what we mean by "insider" and/or "outsider
trading" and proscribing specific conduct as unlawful thereunder, it
seems unlikely that any such legislation will be forthcoming in the
near future. IS For the meantime, we are left with an unfinished judi
cial formulation on our hands derived from Rule lOb-5. This formula
tion performs adequately in certain conditions but has significant
limitations in other circumstances. Our effort here, therefore, is to see
if we can chart out a broader acceptable hypothesis by which insider
and outsider trading can be prohibited.
We propose to start with an unfettered look at the underlying
bases for prohibiting insider trading, that is, to identify the possible
interests which might be affected in any particular transaction where
someone possesses and uses an informational advantage in the
purchase or sale of securities. We then briefly consider the principal
concerns which have caused the Supreme Court to prescribe limita
tions to the existing theories of liability.
In a subsequent part, we undertake a brief review of the develop
ment of the existing jurisprudence under Rule lOb-5-the common
law roots; the "possession" theory espoused in Matter of Cady, Rob
erts & Co. 16 and SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur; 17 the fiduciary principle
limitation announced in Chiarella; and the misappropriation theory
articulated in United States v. Newman, 18 SEC v. Materia l9 and United
States v. Winans,2o among others. Finally, we attempt to describe an
alternative formulation which we believe is both simpler and more
IS. At the hearings on the proposed Insider Trading Sanctions Act, various wit
nesses suggested that Congress add specific language defining what constitutes insider trad
ing. The Senate and House Committees ultimately concluded that such a provision might
"reduce flexibility" and "create new ambiguities" and thus chose not to attempt any statu
tory definition. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1933. H.R. REP., 98th Congo 1st
Sess. I, 13 (1983).
16. 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961). See supra notes 47-50 for a discussion of the posses
sion theory developed from the Cady Roberts decision by the courts in Texas GulfSulphur
and subsequent decisions.
17. 401 F.2d at 848.
18. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 193 (1983).
19. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2112 (1985).
20. 612 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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consistent with the underlying policy reasons for prohibiting insider
trading, and yet at the same time addresses the concerns which have
motivated the Supreme Court's search for limiting principles.
I.

IDENTIFYING THE INTERESTS

We believe that there are at least four interests protected by
adopting a regulatory scheme which imposes liability for engaging in
securities transactions on the basis of material, non public information:
prevention of injury to a shareholder who buys or sells a
security without lawful access to comparable information possessed
by another person engaged in a contemporaneous transaction ("in
jury to shareholder");
2. protection to the owner of proprietary or confidential in
formation against the misuse of that information ("injury to prop
erty right");
3. assurance of the integrity of and confidence in the public
markets for various corporations' securities ("injury to market");
and
4. prevention of unjust enrichment of a person using an infor
mational advantage not obtained through lawful means.
1.

The first interest focuses on a person who engages in a purchase
or sales transaction but would not have done so on the same terms had
that person possessed the same information as was available to other
persons engaged in opposite transactions at the very same time. Such
a shareholder was operating upon assumptions as to the existing cir
cumstances which are, in fact, mistaken. We deem it unfair that
others who know the real circumstances by a means other than by
their own effort and diligence should be able to take advantage of the
former. Such unfairness or injury can arise irrespective of either the
precise method of trading (direct dealings or impersonal market trans
actions) or the status of the wrongdoer (insider, quasi-insider, or
outsider).
The second interest concerns the protection of information which
is valuable in the hands of the owner because the owner has expended
resources to develop the information and/or has the opportunity now
to realize value from its own use of that information. A trader's im
proper use of that information may injure that owner either (1) by
depriving the owner of the opportunity to realize full value,2! (2) by
21. Assume, for example, that an institutional investor has expended considerable
sums on research regarding the probable outcome of major pending litigation between two
parties. Based upon the results of that research, the institutional investor proposes to buy
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increasing acquisition costs,22 or (3) by injury to the owner's reputa
tion and goodwil}.23 While the injury may be just as real as an injury
to shareholders discussed above, the causal linkage or relationship be
tween the injury and the insider'S wrongful gain may be more
attenuated.
The third interest concerns the protection of the market gener
ally. Among the crucial differences between direct dealing transac
tions and impersonal market transactions are that in the latter, one
party generally will not know what person is on the opposite side of
the transaction, and thus will be unable, as a practical matter, to assess
the likelihood that the other person possesses any informational ad
vantage. In a face-to-face transaction, on the other hand, a selling
shareholder knows the identity of the person with whom he or she is
dealing and has the opportunity, whether or not used, to inquire as to
the state of any special facts or circumstances that may be known to
that person. That opportunity generally is absent in an impersonal or
remote market transaction. Accordingly, if shareholders perceive that
others are trading in the impersonal trading markets with significant
informational advantages which the former will be unable to obtain
through their own efforts, they may be reluctant to trade at all. Thus,
prohibitions on insider trading are intended to give assurances to sell
ers and buyers that they are not assuming, in addition to ordinary
the shares of one of the litigants and sell shares of the other. Before the investor is able to
do so, various employees with access to the information buy and sell (short) shares of the
companies, which has the effect of driving up the market price of the prevailing litigant and
driving down the market price of the losing litigant and, in both cases, reducing the profits
otherwise attainable by the institutional investor.
22. Obviously, had Texas Gulf Sulphur's test result information been disclosed to the
public or others prior to the time it completed acquisition of additional land and mining
rights in the Kidd Creek area, the costs of such acquisition would have been substantially
higher. Similarly, purchases in the marketplace by individuals such as Messrs. Chiarella or
Materia, using information theoretically known only to the prospective bidder, could have
the effect of driving up the price of the target companies' stocks (either directly or by
"signaling" to others the interest of the acquirer). Indeed, Anheuser-Busch, Inc., has com
menced a damages action in United States District Court for Northern Texas against Paul
Thayer, a former Busch director, and other defendants accused oftrading on "misappropri
ated" inside information, alleging that the purchase of shares of Campbell Taggart, Inc.,
the target company, by Anheuser-Busch, Inc., cost substantially more as a result of the
improper tipping and trading which occurred. 17 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 45, at
2010 (Nov. 15, 1985).
23. The misuse of confidential information by an employee of a financial printing
firm or a newspaper publisher obviously can cause injury to the reputation of those firms
with their clients. See, e.g., the discussion in Materia, 745 F.2d at 202 ("Among a financial
printer's most valuable assets is its reputation as a safe repository for client secrets.") and
Winans, 612 F. Supp. at 845 ("[T]he Wall Street Journal's reputation for journalistic integ
rity was sullied. ").
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market risks, a risk of dealing with persons possessing unfair informa
tional advantages. 24
This particular type of injury, however, is not one where damages
are suffered by an identifiable participant in an ascertainable amount;
the harm which can result is more in the nature of injury to the value
of a public good or service generally. 25
The first three interests concern one or more specific types of in
jury suffered by some party as a result of insider trading. The fourth,
on the other hand, concerns the benefit or advantage obtained or real
ized by the wrongdoer. It is important to note that this fourth interest
does not necessarily extend to every person who trades using an infor
mational advantage. Thus, traditional concepts of restitution or un
just enrichment require that one person has by "some unconscientious
act or breach of good faith . . . obtained an undue advantage over
another."26 In this regard, it is useful to distinguish, as did Professor
Page Keeton almost fifty years ago, among three alternative means by
which a person obtains material, nonpublic information: (1) by
chance, (2) by effort, or (3) by unlawful or improper means. 27 As to
the third of these classifications, we have little difficulty arguing that it
is unjust for a person to profit from an informational advantage unlaw
fully or improperly obtained. On the other hand, we rarely begrudge
persons the opportunity to trade upon informational advantages devel
24. See, e.g., Texas GulfSulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 852 ("It was the intent of Congress
that all members of the investing public should be subject to identical market risks....").
See also Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 355-56 (1979).
25. We refer to confidence in the integrity of the market as a public good or service
because investors in the marketplace cannot assess in advance the risk, with respect to any
particular security, that insider trading is likely to occur, and thus the risk cannot simply be
factored into the "costs" any particular investor chooses to pay. See, e.g., Dooley, Enforce
ment of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. I, 39-41 (1980):
[I]nvestors cannot before the fact distinguish those companies whose insiders
trade on confidential information from those whose insiders do not. This distinc
tion is impossible not only because insider trading is difficult to detect but also
because the opportunities for insider trading are dependent on the fortuitous oc
currence of significant events and are therefore distributed randomly throughout
the market.
Id. at 41. The legislative history of the recent Insider Trading Sanctions Act indicates a
significant concern on the part of Congress with promotion and maintenance of investor
confidence in the national securities markets. See 129 CONGo REC. H7012-13 (daily ed.
Sept. 19, 1983) (statements of Reps. Wirth and Oxley); 130 CONGo REC. H7757 (daily ed.
July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. DingelI); and 130 CONGo REC. S8912 (daily ed. June 29,
1984) (statement of Rep. D'Amato).
26. J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, § 873 (5th ed. 1941).
27. See Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1, 35
(1936).
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oped through their own lawful industry and effort; indeed, in the ab
sence of any incentive to develop informational advantages, the
securities markets might not function efficiently.28 Access obtained by
chance rather than by effort is a more difficult circumstance to judge.
While our society generally views windfalls resulting from events of
chance as not unfair,29 the line between luck and breach of good faith
sometimes may be hard to ascertain. 30
In any given instance of insider trading, the trader will realize a
substantial benefit, and one or more of the injuries described above
ordinarily will occur as well. Consider, for example, the case where an
officer of Texas Gulf Sulphur bought shares of Texas Gulf Sulphur on
the undisclosed news of the Canadian test drilling site results. There
was little question that the corporate officer benefited directly when
the value of the shares acquired appreciated following the dissemina
tion of the favorable news. We can identify as among the injured in
that instance the following: (1) injury to shareholders, that is, those
persons who sold their shares but would not have had the test results
previously been disclosed publicly; and (2) to a rather unquantifiable
extent, the integrity of the trading markets, that is, investors will be
hesitant to participate in the market for Texas Gulf sulphur securities
specifically, and for other securities generally, if and when they believe
there is a substantial likelihood that others have significant improper
or unfair informational advantages.
In other insider trading situations, different interests may be af
fected. Assume, for example, that a genetic engineering firm has
achieved a significant research breakthrough which when announced
will generate substantial market interest in the firm's shares. The firm
wishes to hold back on a public announcement until it can both file
necessary patent applications to protect its proprietary interest and
lock up certain sources of supply for critical raw materials. A key
employee buys shares of the firm's stock on the basis of the material,
28. See Brudney, supra note 24, at 361-62.
29. Professor Aldave cites the story given at a congressional hearing of a motorist
driving on a deserted road when he observes a huge explosion in the XYZ plant. The
motorist, who owns XYZ stock, immediately calls his broker and instructs the sale of the
XYZ stock before the disaster becomes publicly known. The witness concluded that the
average investor would not bar the motorist from selling securities. See Aldave, supra note
11, at 123, n.119.
30. Indeed, we have a difficult time being clear as to the proper distinction. Is a
person who overhears a conversation in which inside information is disclosed and then acts
upon it simply lucky (to be in such a place at such a time so as to hear that information), or
are they acting in bad faith when they proceed to reap profits in securities transactions
based on that information? Under our formulation, the individual probably will be liable
for any profits obtained. See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text.
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nonpublic information to which he has access. Again, the insider ben
efits directly when the value of the shares acquired appreciates follow
ing the announcement of the favorable development. In addition,
however, the firm itself may be injured if the insider's trading activities
necessitate or result in earlier disclosure of the development before the
firm is able to obtain proprietary protection or negotiate its raw mater
ials requirements contracts. 3 !

II.

COUNTERVAILING CONCERNS

While protection of the foregoing interests generally supports the
imposition of liability for insider trading transactions, there are coun
tervailing concerns. First is the concern for a clear linkage between
the interests being protected and the particular transaction alleged to
have caused injury. For example, the general prohibitions against in
sider trading probably can be applied in transactions involving direct
dealing between two parties without untoward consequences. When
one of two shareholders in XYZ Corporation, individual L, buys the
XYZ shares of the other shareholder K without telling K of material
developments which will enhance the value of the XYZ shares signifi
cantly, we can identify a measurable loss to shareholder K and link it
to an identifiable corresponding unjust gain to shareholder L. 32 On
the other hand, when we move from direct dealing transactions to im
personal transactions effected over a national securities exchange or in
the over-the-counter market, that corresponding linkage usually is
lost. Even though there may well be identifiable losses suffered by
shareholders operating at an informational disadvantage and identifi
able gains improperly realized by persons trading with an informa
tional advantage, the "linkage" between the two may be exceedingly
difficult to establish. If there is no verifiable connection between the
two identifiable amounts, we confront substantial complications in set
ting the appropriate measure of damages. 33
Second is a concern that investors have adequate guidance or no
31. In this instance, the interests of the selling shareholders conflict with those of the
firm. In other words, while the firm will have a bona fide business reason to delay disclo
sure of the material development, that will adversely affect persons selling shares of the firm
who would not have done so had they known of the development.
32. The hypothetical used is substantially the factual situation in the first federal
district court proceeding recognizing a private right of action under Rule IOb-5, Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
33. Thus, for example, in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
495 F.2d 228, 232-33 (2d Cir. 1974), the plaintiffs proved that the defendants had sold
165,000 shares of Douglas Aircraft stock over a period of four days. During the compara
ble time period approximately 605,300 shares were traded on the New York Stock Ex
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tice as to what mayor may not be an unlawful transaction. Without
some guiding or limiting principles or framework, it is difficult for an
investor to determine whether or not he or she has violated insider
trading prohibitions. The very nature of the marketplace puts a pre
mium on investors' obtaining all information relevant to their invest
ment decisions. Furthermore, how is an individual to prove that he or
she did not act on material, nonpublic information not available to
another trading at approximately the same time? To state the matter
in another way, how can there be certainty and predictability of conse
quences for market traders unless the attaching conditions and limits
of liability are known?
Last is a concern that broad prohibitions on insider trading may
stifle market efficiency. When one moves from direct dealing transac
tions where we can easily allocate responsibilities to impersonal na
tional market and exchange transactions, how can we avoid adopting
rules or prohibitions which may have a significant adverse impact
upon lawful efforts to gain informational advantage? When partici
pants and markets are dispersed, the process by which an individual
investor can obtain the greatest amount of useful information prelimi
nary to a sale or purchase of stock decision may be enhanced best by
contracting with an intermediary or professional (for example, a finan
cial analyst) to obtain the information. 34 Presumably, we do not want
to deny that or any other investor the opportunity to acquire such
information if he or she is willing to pay for such services and if those
services are available to any other person willing to pay to acquire the
same. In other words, whatever prohibitions we adopt should not un
reasonably interfere with lawful efforts, theoretically available to all, to
obtain a temporary informational advantage. A general prohibition
against any person seeking an informational advantage would destroy
the functions and significance assumed in the marketplace by in
termediaries such as financial analysts. Would the financial markets
then have any incentive at all to be efficient, to reward diligence and
effort for ferreting out information so that securities will reflect their
intrinsic values?
These three concerns clearly were the major considerations shap
ing the Supreme Court's decisions in Chiarella and Dirks to limit the
scope of various persons' liability under rule lOb-S. After reviewing
the general development of the Rule lOb-S jurisprudence up until the
change. Are the defendants liable for the damages suffered by the purchasers of 165,000
shares or 605,300 shares?
34. See Brudney, supra note 24, at 339-43.
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present time, we will return to attempt to address these concerns
through our alternative formulation.
III.

ORIGINS OF INSIDER TRADING DOCTRINES

In tracing the development of the doctrinal law of Rule lOb-5, it
is appropriate to start with the theories at common law which tradi
tionally applied to bipartite, direct dealing transactions. These cases
reveal two separate theories justifying private recoveries for insider
trading transactions.
The first theory developed out of fraud concepts, beginning with
the tort of active misrepresentation and eventually extending liability
to nondisclosure situations as well. The focus there, of course, was on
the injury suffered by the person who bought or sold securities as a
result of the misrepresentation or nondisclosure. Affirmative or active
misrepresentation cases in which a person misrepresents the true state
of affairs to the other party to the purchase or sale long have been
recognized as supporting the imposition of liability.35 While a differ
ent rule initially applied with respect to those who traded in silence,36
liability often could be established under a "special facts" doctrine. 37
Furthermore, a separate basis for recovery in bipartite transactions
was available through the application of the equitable concept of un
just enrichment. Unlike the misrepresentation or constructive fraud
cases which look to the injury suffered by the victim, the principal goal
of the law of unjust enrichment or restitution is to punish the wrong
doer, that is, to prevent unjust enrichment of a person who has bene
fited from the infringement of another person's interest or by another's
10ss.38
In several of the common law cases most often cited by the fed
35. Barber v. Martin, 67 Neb. 445, 93 N.W. 722 (1903); Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan.
498,77 P. 277 (1904); Poole v. Camden, 79 W. Va. 310,92 S.E. 454 (1917); Reed v. Pitkin,
231 Mich. 621, 204 N.W. 750 (1925); Lightner v. W.H. Hill Co., 258 Mich. 50,242 N.W.
218 (1932); Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 159 P.2d 958 (1945); Fox v.
Cosgriff, 66 Idaho 371, 159 P.2d 224 (1945).
36. E.g., Goodwin v. Agassis, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933). See also the
numerous cases cited in 84 A.L.R. 615, 616-18 to the effect that an insider generally does
not have a fiduciary obligation to disclose to individual shareholders any inside information
when purchasing from or selling to such shareholders.
37. See Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1908); Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S.
419 (1909); Porter v. Healey, 244 Pa. 427, 91 A. 428 (1914); Jacquith v. Mason, 99 Neb.
509, 156 N.W. 1041 (1916); Poole v. Camden, 79 W. Va. 310, 92 S.E. 454 (1917); Hotch
kiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494,
248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
38. See, e.g., Brophy v. Cities Servo Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949); Diamond
V. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
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eral courts applying Rule lOb-5, both the misrepresentation and unjust
enrichment theories are invoked. Thus in Strong v. Repide,39 the
Supreme Court was influenced both by the substantial injury suffered
by the plaintiff in selling shares at a price substantially below their true
value and by the unjust benefit obtained by the defendant through "a
studied and intentional omission ... as part of the deceitful machina
tions to obtain [the stock] ... at a lower price."40 In Diamond v.
Oreamuno,41 Chief Judge Fuld noted that the function of a claim
based upon breach of fiduciary duty through wrongful use of corpo
rate information was "not merely to compensate the plaintiff for
wrongs committed by the defendant but ... to prevent them, by re
moving from agents and trustees all inducement to attempt dealing for
their own benefit in matters which they have undertaken for
others. . . ."42
Because two distinct theories or concepts concerning the interests
and parties involved have supported a finding of liability under the
common law, it should not be surprising that reference was made to a
number of active misrepresentation, nondisclosure, or concealment
and unjust enrichment cases when Rule lOb-5 later came to be applied
to insider trading situations. In Cady, Roberts & Co., the Securities
and Exchange Commission traced the common law development from
Strong, Hotchkiss v. Fischer and other common law cases in laying out
the bases upon which liability could be imposed. 43 However, the
Commission went even further in holding that the application of Rule
lOb-5 was not confined to the limits of such common law principles
but rather that the separate statutory scheme of the federal securities
laws created an independent basis for prohibiting insider trad~ng. In
the Commission's view, authority derived from the Securities Ex
change Act of 1934 enabled the Commission to extend protection to
persons not protected under the common law. 44 Thus in Cady, Rob
erts & Co. the Commission dismissed the argument that a Curtiss
Wright director owed no fiduciary duty, and thus was not liable, to
persons not yet shareholders who had bought the shares of Curtiss
Wright without access to the same information he had. The Commis
39. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
40. Id. at 433.
41. 24 N.Y.2d 494,248 N.E.2d 910,301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969). Courts in at least two
other states have declined to follow the ruling of the New York Court of Appeals in Dia
mond v. Oreamuno. See, e.g., Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975) and Freeman v.
Decio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978).
42. Diamond, 24 N.Y.2d at 498, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
43. 40 S.E.C. 907, 911-14 (1961).
44. Id. at 913-14.
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sion held that the purposes underlying the federal securities laws ne
cessitated an obligation to disclose or refrain from trading on the part
of insiders even with respect to persons and investors not presently
shareholders. 45 The Commission set out what it believed to be the
appropriate elements for establishing violation of Rule 1Ob-5 with re
spect to insider trading:
We have already noted that the anti-fraud provisions are
phrased in terms of 'any person' and that a special obligation has
been traditionally required of corporate insiders, e.g., officers, direc
tors and controlling stockholders. These three groups, however, do
not exhaust the classes of persons upon whom there is such an obli
gation. Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements;
first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indi
rectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the
inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is deal
ing. In considering these elements under the broad language of the
anit-fraud provisions we are not to be circumscribed by fine distinc
tions and rigid classifications. Thus our task here is to identify
those persons who are in a special relationship with a company and
privy to its internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties in
trading in its securities. Intimacy demands restraint lest the unin
formed be exploited. 46

The principles crafted in Cady, Roberts first were embraced judi
cially in Texas Gulf Sulphur. 47 In its introductory discussion of Rule
1Ob-5, the Second Circuit also took note of the Strong and Hotchkiss
precedents at common law and then restated the general principle ar
ticulated in Cady, Roberts, that is, that liability is premised upon the
access to material, nonpublic information not generally available. 48
However, while the Cady, Roberts formulation had definite overtones
relating to the wrongful use by and unjust enrichment of the insider
having access to material, non public information, the Texas Gulf
Sulphur opinion recast the prohibition to turn on the possession of
such information:
Thus, anyone in [the] possession of material inside information
must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled
from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 913.
Id. at 912 (emphasis added).
401 F.2d at 848.
Id.
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chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recom
mending the securities concerned while such inside information re
mains undisclosed. 49

This viewpoint, which came to be characterized as the "posses
sion" theory of Rule lOb-5, was followed in a number of subsequent
federal court cases,50 including, of course, the lower court decision in
the Chiarella case which was reversed by the Supreme Court in 1980.
The standard generally applied in those cases was that any person
"corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic
information may not use that information to trade in securities with
out incurring an affirmative duty to disclose."51 In other words, the
mere possession of material, nonpublic information gave rise to the
duty to disclose or abstain.
The Supreme Court in Chiarella rejected this theory, holding that
"a duty to disclose under § lO(b) does not arise from the mere posses
sion of nonpublic market information."52 In the Court's view, the
insider with access to such information must have a preexisting duty
to disclose arising out of some relationship with the other participants
in the securities transactions. Justice Powell, writing on behalf of the
majority, cites three examples of such a relationship: (1) agency, (2) a
fiduciary relationship, or (3) some other arrangement pursuant to
which "the sellers had placed their trust and confidence" in the de
fendant.53 In support of such a requirement, the Court noted the dis
tinction sometimes made at common law between affirmative
misrepresentation and nondisclosure cases wherein liability attached
to the latter only if the defendant breached a duty to the other parties
through its silence. 54 Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
Court observed that a duty to disclose ordinarily arises "when one
party has information 'that the other [party] is entitled to know be
cause of a fiduciary or similar relation of trust and confidence between
them.' "55
As others have noted, the actual holding of the court in Chiarella
is quite narrow, namely, that the mere possession of material, nonpub
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228 (2d
Cir. 1974); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Haven
Industries, Inc. Securities Litigation, 462 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Nathanson v.
Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
51. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1365.
52. 445 U.S. at 235.
53. Id. at 232.
54. Id. at 228.
55. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976».
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lic information is insufficient to create a duty to disclose or to refrain
from trading. S6 In the context of the objectives or interests underlying
prohibitions on insider trading, such a holding is equivalent to saying
that the mere fact that shareholders (existing or future) are injured by
being at an informational disadvantage, without more, does not estab
lish or constitute a violation of Rule lOb-5. Regrettably, the majority
opinion of the Court addresses neither the significance of the other
interests such as possible injury to property rights or injury to the mar
ket, nor the relevance of issues of unjust enrichment. S7
In Dirks, the Supreme Court took some pains to reemphasize its
rejection of the parity of information theory previously espoused by
the Securities and Exchange Commission, reaffirming its position in
Chiarella that a duty to disclose can only arise from "a specific rela
tionship between two parties."s8 In the Court's view, a tippee could be
liable only if the insider from whom the tippee receives the informa
tion has violated such a duty to disclose:
Thus, some tippees must assume an insider's duty to the share
holders not because they receive inside information, but rather be
cause it has been made available to them improperly . ... Thus, a
tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation
not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the in
sider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclos
ing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should
know that there has been a breach. S9

After Chiarella and Dirks, persons seeking to impose liability
upon others for insider trading activities-whether the Securities and
Exchange Commission or private claimants-thus have three princi
pal alternatives open to them:
1. establish that the person trading had some relationship with
the other participants that creates a duty to disclose;
2. pursue an alternative theory for breach of duty, such as
misappropriation; or
3. distinguish Chiarella and Dirks on the grounds of the nar
56. Justice Burger was careful to emphasize in his dissent that the actual holding of
the majority was thus so limited. See 445 U.S. at 243, n.4. See also Note, supra note 12, at
507.
57. The majority opinion noted the alternative theory offered by the government to
find a breach of duty based upon Chiarella's wrongful appropriation of the information.
The Court did not reach that issue on the ground that it had not been submitted to the jury.
445 U.S. at 235-36.
58. 463 U.S. at 654-55.
59. Id. at 660.
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row holdings relating to the mere possession of inside information
and establish presence of additional factors supporting a basis for
relief.

For the great majority of insider trading cases, there will be a relation
ship (for example, director or officer status, independent contractor or
agent) which can be identified. In those situations the Chiarella and
Dirks holdings allow for the imposition of liability. In outsider trading
situations, however, where there is no specific relationship, trouble
some transactions or conduct still may occur, and it is as to these that
we now turn our attention.
IV.

THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY

Given the groundwork laid in both Justice Stevens' concurring
opinion60 and Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion61 in Chiarella,
it has not taken the lower federal courts much time to develop a mis
appropriation theory to cover many of those situations where a fiduci
ary duty cannot easily be established.
Under the current formulation of the misappropriation theory, a
person violates section lO(b) whenever he improperly obtains or con
verts to his own benefit nonpublic information which he then uses in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 62 The misappropri
ation theory represents a potentially significant advance toward catch
ing the outsider trader in two respects. First, it eliminates the
requirement that an insider breach a fiduciary duty to shareholders
prior to finding a violation. 63 Secondly, it does not make any distinc
tion between persons (that is, tippees) who directly obtain inside infor
mation from an insider who breaches a duty in disclosing that
information and persons who otherwise obtain inside information un
lawfully or improperly.64 Under the theory, traders violate section
lO(b) when they obtain nonpublic information illegitimately.65
This is not to say that under the misappropriation theory there is
no inquiry into the relationship between various of the parties 10
60. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 238-39.
61. Id. at 239-45.
62. Materia, 745 F.2d at 201; Newman, 664 F.2d at 16-17.
63. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., SEC v. Thayer, 17 SEC. REC. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 19, at 841 (1985)
(where an "insider" misappropriated information in breach of fiduciary duty), and Winans,
612 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (where an employee of a newspaper misappropriated
market information).
65. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 (Burger, C.l., dissenting). "A person who has misap
propriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to
refrain from trading." Id.
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volved. Indeed, the first step in the analysis remains a determination
that some of the parties "stand in some confidential or fiduciary rela
tion."66 However, the important distinction is that the field of rele
vant relationships is not limited to that between the trader and the
shareholders with whom he trades. Rather, the field is opened to rela
tionships including parties who, while injured by the violation, are
neither purchasers nor sellers of the securities in question. 67
The misappropriation theory was applied for the first time and
upheld by the Second Circuit in Newman,68 a case decided under the
shadow of Chiarella. In Newman, a brokerage firm manager was
found criminally liable for purchasing the stock of companies that
soon thereafter became takeover targets. Newman learned of the im
pending takeovers through employees of investment banking firms
whose clients "engaged in corporate mergers, acquisitions, tender of
fers, and other takeovers."69 The government did .not allege, nor did
the court hold, that the shareholders who sold their stock to Newman
had been defrauded. Having no fiduciary relationship with those
shareholders, temporary or otherwise, Newman had no duty under
Chiarella to disclose to the sellers.70 No insider had breached a fiduci
ary duty; the corporate insiders had revealed the information legiti
mately and in confidence to the investment banking firms. Thus,
under the reasoning of Dirks, Newman would have no liability for the
transactions affected. Nevertheless, the court held that Newman was
criminally liable for violation of Rule lOb-5 in that he had participated
in a breach of trust and confidence shared between the investment
banking firm and its corporate clients. The breach, according to the
opinion, sullied the reputation of the investment banking firms "as safe
repositories of client confidences. "71 In addition, the purchases "artifi
cially inflated" the stock prices of the target companies, thereby injur
66. Id. at 239-40 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
67. As might be anticipated, this raises a right of standing issue because of the nar
row limits to a private right of action under the securities laws. See 445 U.S. at 238 (Ste
vens, J., concurring). This has not proven, however, to be a serious obstacle to application
of the misappropriation theory. See infra note 79. But see Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc.,
719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).
68. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
69. Id. at 15.
70. Id. at 15. Indeed, because there was no fiduciary relationship, the Second Circuit
affirmed the dismissal, for lack of standing, of subsequent suits by shareholders who had
traded with Newman. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1983).
In Newman, the court held that the standing issue was not relevant to a criminal action.
664 F.2d at 17.
71. Newman, 664 F.2d at 16-17.
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ing the corporate clients.72
The Second Circuit reaffirmed the principles of the misappropria
tion theory in Materia. 73 The facts of the case were strikingly similar
to the Chiarella circumstances. The defendant, Materia, was a copy
reader for Bowne of New York City, Inc., a financial printing firm.
Among the printing services performed for clients by Bowne was the
preparation of proposed tender offer filings. Bowne made every effort
to keep such corporate information confidential, using both blanks and
code names for companies that were attempting takeovers and/or
were the subject of takeover attempts. In addition, Bowne had posted
notices visible to its employees that warned against trading on infor
mation discovered in the course of their work. In spite of these efforts
and disregarding the warnings, Materia ascertained from information
at the printing firm the names of at least four companies that were
soon to be takeover targets. In each case, Materia purchased stock in
the target before the announcement of a tender offer. Upon the stock's
increasing in value after the announcements, Materia sold his shares. 74
The Securities and Exchange Commission charged Materia with
violations of sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act,
as well as Rules lOb-5 and 14e-3. The Commission's theory was that
Materia had traded "on the basis of material nonpublic information he
had misappropriated from his employer and its clients."75 Materia ar
gued that under the Chiarella holding his actions were not illegaP6
The Commission argued, and the Second Circuit agreed, that Materia
had perpetrated a fraud against his employer. The employer, in tum,
enjoyed a confidential relationship with those companies who had
shared confidential information with Bowne for the purpose of prepar
ing the tender offer materials. By "trading on confidences," Materia
"undermined" the relationship between the printing firm and its
clients. 77
Importantly, the fact that Materia did not learn of the informa
tion in question from insiders of the issuer is irrelevant under the mis
appropriation theory. The information need only be improperly
obtained. 78 It is similarly irrelevant that neither the employer nor its
clients were the persons who traded with or at the same time as
72.
73.

Id. at 17-18.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 199.
Id. at 199-200.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 202.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.

745 F.2d at 201.
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Materia. In other words, if a confidential relationship with another
party has been breached by the misappropriator, and the misappropri
ation relates to information regarding the securities of an issuer, that is
sufficient to constitute being "in connection with" a purchase or sale of
securities. 79
A more recent application of the theory occurred in Winans. so
There, R. Foster Winans, formerly one of the authors of the "Heard
on the Street" column of the Wall Street Journal, was charged with
violating section 1O(b) by disclosing to others the timing, content, and
tenor of market-sensitive stories about various companies. The other
individuals proceeded to trade in the securities of the issuer in question
in advance of the story's publication, realizing a profit when the mar
ket value of the securities went up or down after the column ap
peared. 8) The government's principal theory was that since Winans
knew, pursuant to the Wall Street Journal's policies, that "he was not
supposed to leak the timing or contents of his articles or trade on that
knowledge," his appropriation of the confidential information regard
ing the nature and timing of those articles for the personal benefit of
himself and the co-conspirators operated as a fraud upon his
employer.82
Winans argued that application of the misappropriation theory
was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Chiarella and
Dirks that a duty to disclose exists only if a "specific relationship [ex
ists] between the shareholders and the individual trading on inside in
formation."83 Federal District Judge Stewart distinguished Chiarella
and Dirks simply by classifying those decisions as "one chapter [of the
book on insider or outsider trading] with respect to one type of fraudu
lent trading. That type is not before US."84 Winans also contended
that applying the misappropriation theory essentially was equivalent
to adopting the "parity of information" doctrine expressly rejected in
Chiarella. Judge Stewart disagreed, responding:
The Chiarella majority also did not accept the view that an infor
mational advantage which is not 'legally available to others,' known
as the access to information theory, should be the basis for drawing
the line. 445 U.S. at 235 n.20, 100 S. Ct. at 1118 n.20, see also
79. The court characterized Materia's argument that his actions were not "in con
nection with" a purchase or sale as "spurious." 745 F.2d at 203.
80. 612 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
81. Id. at 829-38.
82. Id. at 842.
83. Id. at 841.
84. Id. at 842.
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Dirks, supra, 463 U.S. at 672, 103 S. Ct. at 327. But we do not agree
that the misappropriation theory is in conflict. The focus of the ap
proach before us is not on whether the defendant had an informa
tional advantage that others could not legally obtain, but on how the
defendant gained the advantage, which must befraudulently.85

While various federal courts, particularly in the Second Circuit,
thus have succeeded, through use of the misappropriation theory, in
imposing liability in unique situations left unprotected by the fiduciary
duty standard of Chiarella, there are several conceptual problems in
volved with the use of such a theory. As has been noted elsewhere,86
there is concern whether the theory is consistent with Santa Fe Indus
tries, Inc. v. Green.87 Under the reasoning of the latter case, no action
lies under Rule lOb-5 for claims based upon mismanagement or
breach of fiduciary duty unless the alleged conduct involved some de
ception or misrepresentation regarding either the purchase or sale of
securities. 88 The conduct which constitutes a breach of duty in cases
such as Newman, Materia, or Winans sounds more like breach of con
tract than a deception or misrepresentation regarding the purchase or
sale of securities. On the other hand, one can point to approving com
ments in the legislative history of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act as
indicative of Congress' tacit endorsement of the misappropriation the
ory and its intent that prohibitions of Rule lOb-5 encompass such
activities.89
A more difficult conceptual issue is when and how to delineate
the relevant relationships which will or will not support a misappro
priation claim under Rule lOb-5. The reasoning and approach used by
a number of the federal courts to find a relationship which has been
breached often seems artificial or strained. In Newman, it was undis
puted that the investment banking firms shared a confidential relation
ship with their clients who were the issuers of the securities in
question. There was, however, no relationship between Newman and
the investment banking firms or between Newman and the issuers.
Why did Newman owe a duty to the investment banking firms to "ab
stain or disclose"? He was not their agent. The investment banking
firms' own employees had committed the breach. Was their duty to
their employer transferred to Newman upon their disclosure of the
85.
86.
lips and
87.
88.
89.

Id. (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 11, at 46-49; Note, supra note 12, at 523; Phil
Zutz, supra note 12, at 91-92.
430 U.S. 462 (1977).
Id. at 474-477.
See supra notes 100-109 and accompanying text.
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information? If this was the court's reasoning, it is no less circuitous
and artificial than that used to find derivative fiduciary duties for tip
pees. 90 Where does the transfer of the duty to disclose stop? Are
persons who learn from Newman and trade also liable? What about
traders who receive the information fifth-hand and sixth-hand?
The application of the misappropriation theory in the cited cases
raises questions as to the appropriate guidelines for determining when
confidential relationships exist that are subsequently breached by trad
ing activities. While in Materia and Winans the employee-employer
relationship created a presumption of confidentiality between Materia
and Bowne and between Winans and the Wall Street Journal, other
relationships may not give rise to such a presumption. Persons may
trade on material, non public information from sources who are merely
business associates. In other cases, the relationship of the source of
the information may range from a family member to a passing ac
quaintance. 91 Yet in these latter situations the prospects for the per
90. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
One of the more interesting recent insider trading cases initiated by the Securities &
Exchange Commission concerned the alleged breach of trust arising out of a psychiatrist
patient relationship. A psychiatrist who treated the spouse of an official of Posi-Seal Inter
national, Inc., was alleged to have engaged in trading transactions based upon information
disclosed to the psychiatrist in the course of the treatment. The Commission alleged viola
tions of the insider trading provisions, claiming among other matters that the information
had been disclosed to the psychiatrist under the expectation that all information would be
kept confidential. The charges were settled without admission or denial by agreement of
the psychiatrist to disgorge profits made and by payment of a civil penalty. Wall St. J.,
March 4, 1986, at 10, col. 4.
91. Some of the difficulties involved with a determination of confidentiality are illus
trated in the recent case of United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The
relevant facts were that the Standard Oil Company of California intended to purchase all of
the outstanding shares of Amax, Inc., at a price that was approximately twice the market
value. Thomas Reed allegedly learned of this offer from his father, Gordon Reed, who was
a member of the Amax board of directors. Thomas Reed had no relationship with Amax
or Standard Oil. His father's disclosure of the impending offer, it was alleged, was made in
confidence "and on the expectation that the son would not trade ...." Id. at 698-99.
Thomas Reed purchased call options at a total cost of slightly more than $3,000 prior to
public announcement of the offer. After the announcement, he realized total profits ex
ceeding $400,000.
Thomas Reed moved to dismiss the charges, contending that he did not have the req
uisite relationship of trust and confidence to enable an action to be sustained against him.
The court, in an extensive review of both federal securities case law and common law prin
ciples of confidentiality, attempted to provide some guidelines for a legal determination of
the requisite confidential relationship. Id. at 703-18. It ultimately held that the govern
ment would prevail if it could show at trial that Reed and his father were bound by an
understanding of confidentiality, express or implied, or that some regular pattern of behav
ior by Reed and his father generated a justifiable expression of confidentiality and fidelity.
Id. at 718. While noting that three elements are generally recognized as aspects to a confi
dential relationship, i.e., "disparity of position," reliance, and "controlling influence," the
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son trading to obtain unjust gains and for others to be injured thereby
are equally as great as they were in Materia and Winans.
Thus we question both the utility and appropriateness of such an
alternative relationship inquiry. Aside from the difficulties inherent in
such a determination, a confidential relationship requirement suffers
from the same drawback as the fiduciary duty standard of Chiarella
it fails to focus on the central issue of the purposes and objectives un
derlying prohibitions against insider trading generally.
To be sure, injuries to various property rights have been sustained
in the misappropriation cases decided to date. In Newman, the injury
concerned the reputation of the investment banking firms and the fact
that their clients might have had to pay more in the tender offers being
effected.92 In Materia, the reputation of the printing firm was at risk;93
in Winans, the injury sustained was to the Wall Street Journal and its
reputation. 94 However, those are not the core interests or objectives
involved; they are cited only because the lower federal courts have
been unsure what otherwise to rely upon in light of the narrow and
restrictive holdings of Chiarella and Dirks. The issues really involved
include (1) the unjust enrichment of Newman, Materia, and Winans
through the use of information not even intended to be available for
their personal benefit; (2) the losses suffered by persons selling or buy
ing securities on the opposite end of these trading transactions without
access to the same information; and (3) the injury to the integrity of
the securities markets themselves. While the misappropriation cases
add an interesting chapter and a formula which occasionally will be
useful in covering transactions not strictly within the fiduciary duty
standard of Chiarella, we might well ask whether it is not time to con
clude that a broader hypothesis is needed than that articulated m
either Chiarella, Dirks, or the misappropriation cases.

v.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS ACT

In formulating a broader hypothesis, we need to factor in the en
actment of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA).95 At
court conceded that there is a "lack of universality and uniformity of practice among courts
and commentators in their analysis." Generally whether a confidential relationship exists
is an issue of fact to be determined by the trier of the facts. Id. at 717.
Reed ultimately was acquitted of criminal charges after a jury trial. 17 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) No. 50, at 2179 (Dec. 20, 1985).
92. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
95. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)
(Supp. 1985».
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the time the Securities and Exchange Commission first pressed for
ITSA, the Commission represented that it merely sought additional
enforcement remedies and that it was satisfied with the existing sub
stantive law under Rule lOb-5. Thus, ITSA theoretically merely
(1) added authority for the Commission to seek civil penalties against
persons engaged in unlawful insider trading of up to three times the
amount of profits made or losses avoided by the person trading,96 and
(2) extended insider trading prohibitions to option and other deriva
tive instruments. 97
However, several factors suggest that, in approving ITSA, Con
gress intended that Rule lOb-5 be given a more expansive application
with respect to insider trading transactions than the Supreme Court
has in Chiarella and Dirks. Indeed, one can assert with considerable
force four points in support of the proposition that Congress intended
that the courts follow principles closer in philosophy to the equal ac
cess/possession theories of pre-Chiarella cases98 than to the fiduciary
type standard of Chiarella. 99
The first point to be noted is the language of ITSA itself. The
conduct which triggers the civil penalty provision of ITSA, now sec
tion 21 (d)(2)(A) of the 1934 Act, is the purchase or sale of "a security
while in the possession of material nonpublic information. . . . "100
There is no reference to any preexisting duty or fiduciary obligation,
but merely to "possession" as the jurisdictional nexus. The extension
of liability to purchasers or sellers of options or other derivative instru
ments also raises an inference that no preexisting duty or relationship
is necessary to establish liability, since no fiduciary duty traditionally
has been owed by corporate officers and directors to option and similar
security holders. 101
Secondly, the legislative history of ITSA makes little mention of
fiduciary or other relationships; rather, it is replete with references to
informational advantages and differences improperly obtained. The
House Report quotes favorably from Brudney's masterful article:
The inability of a public investor with whom an insider trans
acts on inside information ever lawfully to erode the insider's infor
96. Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 2.
97. Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 5.
98. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
100. Pub. L. No. 98-376, §§ 2, 5.
101. Laventhal v. General Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. de
nied, 104 S. Ct. 150 (1983). See also Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act and Its
Effect on Existing Law, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1273, 1290-1291 (1984).
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mational advantage generates a sense of unfairness.
The
unfairness is not a function merely of possessing more informa
tion-outsiders may possess more information than other outsiders
by reason of their diligence or zeal-but of the fact that it is an
advantage which cannot be competed away since it depends upon a
lawful privilege to which [other investors] cannot acquire access. 102

The comments of Representatives Wirth and Dingell on the floor of
the House of Representatives stressed t~e importance of general public
confidence in the securities markets and the "fundamental expecta
tions of fairness and honesty," and characterized the conduct of those
acting on inside information as "thieves."103 Senator D'Amato argued
in a similar vein on the Senate floor in support of ITSA:
Some commentators have called insider trading a victimless
crime, however, I strongly disagree. The investor who trades with a
person possessing nonpublic inside information is clearly at a severe
informational disadvantage. In addition, the integrity of the market
is violated, which results in a loss of investor confidence. John Fed
ders, the Director of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Di
vision of Enforcement, has stated publicly that he believes that
those who engage in insider trading are thieves, I concur whole
heartedly with Mr. Fedders. 104

The emphasis in the legislative deliberation thus was on the unjustness
of the trader's profits and on the injuries suffered, both by sharehold
ers directly and with respect to the integrity of and public confidence
in the securities markets when insider trading occurs.
Thirdly, the circumstances existing at the time of ITSA's enact
ment suggest that both the Securities and Exchange Commission,
which initially requested the legislation, and Congress anticipated that
the Commission should not be restricted by the limitations imposed by
the Supreme Court in the Chiarella and Dirks decisions. On one hand,
Chiarella had been rendered moot by the Securities and Exchange
Commission's subsequent promulgation of Rule 14e-3 under the more
specific authority of the Willia,ms Act provisions. lOS Conduct by per
sons in positions similar to Chiarella and Materia thus was in violation
102. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983, H.R. REP., 98th Cong., 1st Sess, 1, S
(1983) (citing Brudney, supra note 24, at 346) [hereinafter cited as ITSA] ,
103, 129 CONGo REC. H7012 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1983) (statement of Rep. Wirth);
130 CONGo REC. H71S7 (daily ed. July 2S, 1984) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
104. 130 CONGo REC. S8912 (daily ed. June 29,1984) (statement of Rep. D'Amato).
lOS. The language of Rule 14e-3 is nearly identical to that of Rule 10b-S except that
the former applies specifically to misrepresentations, omissions, and other fraudulent prac
tices in connection with tender offers. See 17 C.F.R. 240 14e 3.
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of Rule 14e-3, and criminal and administrative sanctions could be im
posed as a result of any such violations. Technically, therefore, Rule
lOb-5 was not needed in order to impose appropriate sanctions on
traders such as Vincent Chiarella or Anthony Materia. 106 On the other
hand, the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks, which was issued after
the initial hearings in ITSA but before its final enactment, initially did
raise concerns in the congressional committees. Thus, the House
Committee was prompted to request that the Commission make a fol
low-up report to Congress on the impact, if any, of Dirks on the Com
mission's subsequent enforcement activities. 107
Finally, several of the cases cited approvingly in the House and
Senate Reports as illustrative of the then current state of Rule lOb-5
are based upon broader concepts than the Supreme Court espoused in
Chiarella and Dirks. Thus the House Report cites several examples of
"the legal principles governing the smaller number of cases that in
volve trading on market information that originates from sources
other than the company."108 These include Rule 14e-3, Newman (a
clear articulation of the misappropriation theory), and SEC v. Lund109
("temporary insider" liable for transaction based upon nonpublic in
formation even though no preexisting duty).
The legislative history of ITSA suggests that the crucial inquiry is
one similar to that noted by Judge Stewart in Winans-was the infor
mational advantage improperly obtained, that is, one which others
cannot obtain through lawful means or competition. 110
VI.

A

RESTATED STANDARD

From the foregoing, we propose the following standard for the
imposition of insider or outsider trading liability: Whether a trader
realizes profits or avoids losses whenever trading on an informational
advantage that the trader knows others cannot obtain through lawful
means or competition. The objectives and interests to be served should
be clear from our prior discussion. The relevant questions remaining
at this point are: (1) Will this standard pass muster with the Supreme
Court? (2) Does such a standard address any more effectively the con
106. It is interesting to note that in SEC v. Materia, the Second Circuit not with
standing the availability of Rule 14e-3 as a basis for imposing liability, chose to employ the
more general Rule IOb-5 utilizing the misappropriation theory. See supra notes 73-79 and
accompanying text.
107. ITSA supra note 102, at 14-15.
108. Id. at 13, n.20.
109. 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
110. Winans, 612 F. Supp. at 842.
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cerns which spawned the limiting principles of Chiarella and Dirks?
(3) Is there really any need for such a refurbished standard?
We tum first to the question of whether our standard would pass
muster with the Supreme Court. One might expect that a future de
fendant being subjected to this standard would claim, as did Winans,
that the formulation is essentially the same as the parity of informa
tion standard rejected in Chiarella and Dirks. There are three appro
priate responses to that argument. First, as Judge Stewart noted in his
Winans decision, the focus is not on the disparity of informational ad
vantage, but rather on how the defendant obtained such, that is,
through wrongful conduct. III Where a defendant obtains an informa
tional advantage by his own effort and initiative and without acting
wrongfully, that defendant will have no liability. Second, our stan
dard is consistent with what the common law long has recognized as
proper bases for an unjust enrichment claim, namely, where a person
unfairly or in bad faith benefits from the infringement of another per
son's interest. 112 Third, in its enactment of ITSA, Congress expressed
specific views with respect to the policies underlying prohibitions on
insider trading, indicating support and approval of doctrines and cases
broader than those articulated in Chiarella and Dirks.ll3
Another argument might utilize that concern which caused the
Supreme Court to fashion the limiting principles articulated in
Chiarella and Dirks, namely, the problem of linkage between the
wrongful insider trading and the ascertainable amount of injuries suf
fered by others. Indeed, that problem is present even in the most
traditional of insider-trading-type cases, that is, when a corporate of
ficer or director trades on inside corporate information. It is a prob
lem inherent in the fact that from a particular trading transaction
three possible types of injuries may result, 114 someone wrongfully will
receive an unjust benefit, and none of these is necessarily mathemati
cally related to any other. Two solutions suggest themselves, and
neither is novel. In the first instance, where ascertainable damages are
not claimed and/or cannot be shown, as, for example, in the Newman
or Winans situations, we may continue not to recognize private actions
but rely instead upon criminal and administrative sanctions to protect
and carry out the intended objectives. lIs Secondly, we can choose to
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
under the

Id.
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
See supra text at notes 21-25.
This has been the approach followed generally with respect to cases brought
misappropriation theory where the principal injury established was to the owner
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measure damages in a manner consistent with the fourth interest un
derlying insider trading prohibitions,116 namely, by restitution from
the wrongdoer of the amount by which he has been unjustly
enriched. I 17
Reference to the principles of unjust enrichment and the law of
restitution also may serve us well with respect to the Supreme Court's
concern for certainty and guidance to persons engaged in securities
transactions as to when liability may attach. The concepts of unjust
enrichment are not foreign or difficult to grasp; indeed, there is a great
deal of legal doctrine developed from contract law which may help
differentiate between persons acting properly and in good faith and
persons knowingly exploiting an advantage improperly obtained. Fur
thermore, it seems to us that the emphasis on the propriety of the
trader's use and whether or not others have comparable opportunity
to obtain the information should assure that the activities of financial
analysis and other lawful market intermediaries will not be foreclosed
or unfairly impinged upon. I IS
Lastly, we come to the question of whether we need a reformu
lated standard. If the fiduciary standard of Chiarella works for most
traditional insider cases, if Rule 14e-3 will cover most tender offer situ
ations, and if the misappropriation theory can be applied in many
other unique settings, why bother with any other standard? We sug
gest three brief responses. First, we submit that the alternative formu
lation proposed more directly reflects both the interest served by
insider trading prohibitions and the historical common law remedies
available to injured parties. By this we mean that an appropriate stan
dard should focus as much on the improper conduct of the trader and
the benefits unjustly received by him as it does on the parties and inter
ests seeking to be protected. The fiduciary principle espoused in
Chiarella, on the other hand, ignores both if the court can find no
preexisting duty or relationship between the parties. Second, such a
standard obviates the necessity for creating or rationalizing the exist
ence of a relationship which has been breached as in some of the mis
appropriation cases.
Finally, our standard may enable the
of the confidential information. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.
1983); contra the pending action instituted by Anheuser-Busch, Inc., against Paul Thayer
supra note 22.
116. See supra text at notes 26-27.
117. See generally Thompson, The Measure ofRecovery Under rule JOb-5: A Restitu
tion Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REV. 349, 365-380 (1984).
118. Brudney discussed this matter at length in his 1979 article. While other issues
raised by him were cited by the Supreme Court in the Chiarella and Dirks decisions, this
part of his analysis was overlooked or disregarded. See Brudney, supra note 24, at 360-64.
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Commission or a court to reach troublesome' conduct which under
either the fiduciary duty standard or the misappropriation theory
would not be viewed as unlawful.
To illustrate this last point, we would recall the case decided two
years ago of Barry Switzer, the University of Oklahoma head football
coach. 119 Switzer overheard, at a track meet, inside information about
a corporation which was not intended for his use. 120 Switzer recog
nized the information as material, nonpublic information and not only
bought shares to profit personally on the information, but spread the
tip to other business associates so they also could share in inside
profits. 121
The information concerned the proposed liquidation of a publicly
traded company engaged in oil and gas exploration. Prior to the dis
semination of that information, die company's common stock was
trading in the $39-$42 range; after the public announcement of the
Board of Directors' intentions, the value of the stock increased first to
$61 per share and subsequently to as high as $79 718. Switzer and the
other persons who traded on the basis of the information realized ag
gregate profits of approximately $591,000. 122
The Oklahoma federal district court judge, applying the Chiarella
and Dirks analysis, found no breach of duty by the insider who had
been discussing the nonpublic information which Switzer overheard
and concluded that none of the persons involved in the trading activi
ties thus could be liable as tippees. 123 That outcome is a classic exam
ple of the limitations and deficiencies of the fiduciary duty standard of
Chiarella and Dirks.
Under the standard we propose above, persons in those circum
stances would be found liable if and when they trade on information
they know is material, nonpublic, and not intended for their own bene
fit. In other words, once a person is aware that he has an informa
119. SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
120. Id. at 762. The Securities and Exchange Commission, the complaining party in
the proceeding, obviously believed that Switzer's overhearing the information was not all
that accidental, but rather that the information had been expressed aloud by the insider for
Switzer's benefit. The Commission, however, was unable to support that belief with suffi
cient independent evidence. Id. at 768.
Professor Aldave cites this case as an example of fortuitious discovery of insider infor
mation for which no sanctions would apply under existing theories of lOb-5 liability. Al
dave, supra note 11 at 122, n.1l5. We disagree and believe it represents an example of
troublesome conduct that a broader formulation as to trading liability should cover.
121. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. at 766. Court said that the plaintiffs had not proven that
the defendant knew the information was material.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 766.
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tional advantage which no other person then participating in the
marketplace can duplicate through research or other lawful means,
that person will be liable under the standard we propose. 124
Evaluating Switzer's and similar outside traders' conduct in the
context of the interests we have identified in this article, imposition of
liability appears a most appropriate result. In the first instance, we
can identify a known class of shareholders injured by the Switzer
group's improper use of the inside information, that is, those persons
on the opposite sides of the market transactions without either access
to such information or any comparable opportunity to obtain the
same. We know that those persons lost possible profits at least equal
to those obtained by the quickly formed Switzer trading group, that is,
at least $591,000. Secondly, we know that use of inside information in
such a manner will tend to undermine public confidence in the integ
rity of the marketplace. Thirdly, and perhaps most significant in this
instance, is the substantial enrichment of those trading on the inside
information, the possession of which was not a result of their own
effort, skill, or diligence, but, at best, of fortuitous circumstances or, at
worst, of lack of care or intentional favoritism by an insider. The im
position of liability in such a circumstance thus would further the in
terests underlying prohibition on insider trading and still avoid
impinging upon the activities of persons lawfully engaged in research,
trading, or investment activities. It is regrettable that some lower
courts, such as in the Switzer case, have chosen not to explore beyond
the limits of the Chiarella and Dirks fiduciary duty standard. We hope
that this article has laid out a logical and historically based means for
doing so-with the ultimate objective that the outer limits of insider
trading liability reach to all improper conduct.

124. As a practical matter, that probably means that a claim of "fortuitous discov
ery" of the information will afford no defense, so long as the person then traded with
knowledge that the information was non public, material, and afforded them a very distinct
trading advantage over others.

